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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Petitioner-Appellant Zane Jack Fields appeals from the district court's 
Memorandum Decision and Order denying sentencing relief based upon claims in his 
"Petition for Post-Conviction Relief or Writ of Habeas Corpus" and "Motions to Correct 
Illegal Sentences, to Vacate Sentences of Death and for New Sentencing Trial," primarily 
stemming from the Supreme Court's decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), 
after his death sentence was already final. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Underlying Criminal And Prior Post-Conviction 
Proceedings 
The "material facts" leading to Fields' conviction for first-degree murder and his 
sentence of death for the murder of Katherine Marie Vanderford are summarized in State 
v. Fields, 127 Idaho 904,907-08,908 P.2d 121 1 (1995) (Fields I): 
At approximately 1 1 :15 a.m., February 1 1, 1988, Vanderford was 
stabbed to death while working at the Wishing Well Gift Shop (the 
Wishing Well) in Boise. The stabbing occurred during a robbery in which 
approximately fifty dollars in cash was taken. Vanderford was working 
alone in the shop at the time. Soon after the perpetrator left, Ralph P. 
Simmons (Simmons) arrived at the store. When Simmons arrived 
Vanderford was speaking to the emergency dispatcher. Simmons put 
pressure on a wound on Vanderford's neck and began speaking with the 
dispatcher. 
Ada County Police Detective Randy Folwell (Folwell), who was in 
the area at the time, heard the emergency dispatch and drove to the 
Wishing Well. Vanderford told Folwell that her attacker was a lone male 
who had left the store. Emergency medical personnel soon arrived and 
began treating Vanderford. Vanderford was immediately transported to 
Saint Alphonsus Hospital. 
Dr. Frank J. Fazzio, Jr., the doctor who treated Vanderford when 
she arrived at the emergency room, testified that Vanderford was in full 
cardiac arrest upon arrival. Vanderford was never resuscitated. Dr. 
Fazzio opined that Vanderford's death was a result of loss of blood. Frank 
A. Roberts, the pathologist who performed the autopsy on Vanderford, 
similarly concluded that the cause of death was loss of blood as a result of 
stab wounds, primarily a neck wound. 
The State also called a number of witnesses who identified Fields 
as a person they saw in or near the store immediately before and after the 
incident. . . . 
Most of the State's remaining witnesses were inmates who testified 
about statements Fields made about the killing while in jail. 
An Information was filed charging Fields with Katherine's first-degree murder, 
which was committed "willfully, unlawfully, and with malice aforethought . . . by 
stabbing her in the neck, chest, and back from which she died on February 11, 1988, 
which murder was committed in the perpretation [sic] of a robbery andlor burglary." 
(##19185/19809, R., pp.17-18.)' Upon completion of his trial, a jury found Fields guilty 
as charged. (##19185119809, R., p.104.) After a sentencing hearing, the district court 
found the state had proven three statutory aggravating factors, including: (1) utter 
disregard, I.C. 5 19-2515(g)(6); (2) the murder was committed in the perpetration of a 
robbery andlor burglary and was accompanied by an intent to cause death, I.C. § 19- 
251 5(g)(7); and (3) propensity, I.C. § 19-251 5(g)(8).2 (##19185119809, R., pp.167-74.) 
After weighing the collective mitigation against each of the statutory aggravating factors 
individually, the court sentenced Fields to death. (##19185/19809, R., pp.164-79.) 
' Because there are multiple records and transcripts in this appeal, the state will refer to 
the records and transcripts by their respective supreme court docket numbers. The 
supreme court docket numbers for Fields' underlying trial, sentencing and first post- 
conviction case are ##I 9 185 and 19809. The supreme court docket number for Fields' 
first successive post-conviction case is #24119. The supreme court docket number for his 
second successive post-conviction case, and the subject of this appeal, is #35679. 
The citations to the Idaho Code have subsequently been amended and are now 
delineated as I.C. 5 19-2515(9)(e), (t), and (g). 
Fields filed his first post-conviction petition on April 18, 1991. (##I 91 8511 9809, 
R., pp.197-203.) After being appointed new counsel, an amended petition was filed 
(##I91 85119809, R., pp.218-19), which was denied after an evidentiary hearing 
(##19185119809, R., pp.226-35). Fields filed another amended petition for post- 
conviction relief and motion for new trial (##19185119809, Supp. R., pp.9-lo), which 
was also denied after another evidentiary hearing (##19185/19809, Supp. R., pp.58-62). 
On appeal, Fields did not raise a claim regarding jury involvement in the 
sentencing process, which also was not raised at anytime prior to his sentencing. See 
Fields I. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Fields' conviction, death sentence and 
denial of post-conviction relief on February 16, 1995. Id. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Fields' Second Post-Conviction Case 
After filing a federal w i t  of habeas corpus, Fields returned to state court and filed 
his first successive post-conviction petition (#24119, R., pp.4-51), which included a claim 
that the trial court's failure to submit the statutory aggravating factors to a jury violated 
his Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights (#24119, R., p.31). The district court 
concluded Fields failed to satisfy the requirements of I.C. 19-2515(5) because his 
claims were known or reasonably could have been known when he filed his first post- 
conviction petition, and entered a final order denying relief. (#24119, R., pp.87-96, 130- 
35.) The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision denying post- 
conviction relief on September 7, 2000. Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 17 P.3d 230 
(2000) (Fields 11). 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Fields' Successive Post-Conviction Petition Based 
Upon Rinp v. Arizona 
On June 24, 2002, the Supreme Court issued Ring, expressly overruling, in part, 
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), which had specifically held that a judge, sitting 
without a jury, was permitted to find statutory aggravating factors even if necessary for 
imposition of the death penalty. In Rinp, the Court concluded a jury must now find the 
statutory aggravating factors before a death sentence can be imposed. 536 U.S. at 589. 
On August 2,2002, relying in part upon Ring, Fields filed the instant "Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief or Writ of Habeas Corpus" and "Motions to Correct Illegal 
Sentences, to Vacate Sentences of Death and for New Sentencing Trial," containing eight 
separate claims. (#35679, R., pp.5-14.)3 The state filed a response asking that the 
petition be dismissed because Ring does not apply retroactively, and even if Ring applies 
retroactively, the jury's finding of guilt in Fields' case was sufficient to establish the 
felony-murder with intent aggravator. (#35679, R., pp.37-46.) After extensive briefing, 
on August 5, 2008, relying primarily upon Hoffman v. State, 142 Idaho 27, 29, 121 P.3d 
958 (2005), the district court granted the state's motion to dismiss, concluding Ring is not 
retroactive to cases in collateral review and the petition is "expressly barred by Idaho 
Code Section 19-2719." (#35679, R., pp.293-304.) Fields' timely notices of appeal were 
filed September 12,2008. (#35679, R., pp.307-14.)4 
Four claims rely directly upon Ring. (#35679, pp.10-13, 77 V(B)(l), (2), (4) and (6)) 
Only claim two is the direct subject of Fields' appeal. Although claim three does not 
directly cite Rinp, it is implicitly based upon Rinp. Claim five does not involve Rinp, but 
is a "mens rea" argument based upon Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). Claim 
seven is a "confinement" issue that is also unrelated to &. Finally, claim eight 
involves an "execution" claim that is unrelated to &. 
' Fields also has a "DNA" post-conviction case pending before this Court; tlie parties are 
settling the record. Fields v. State, Idaho Supreme Court Case No. 36508-2009. 
While Fields' appeal has been pending, five Idaho death-sentenced inmates had 
petitions for certiorari granted with an order remanding to the Idaho Supreme Court "for 
further consideration in light of Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. --- (2008)~"~ Rhoades 
v. Idaho, --- U.S. ---, 128 S.Ct. 1441 (2008); McKinney v. Idaho, --- U.S. ---, 128 S.Ct. 
1441 (2008); Pizzuto v. Idaho, --- U.S. ---, 128 S.Ct 1441 (2008); Card v. Idaho, --- U.S. 
---, 128 S.Ct. 1442 (2008); Hairston v. Idaho, --- U.S. ---, 128 S.Ct. 1442 (2008). 
Another death-sentenced inmate, Gene Francis Stuart, has raised similar Rine, arguments 
on appeal. See Stuart v. State, Idaho Supreme Court Case ##34198,34199. All six cases 
have been consolidated for oral argument before the Idaho Supreme Court on August 24, 
2009. (Appendices A and B.) 
in Danforth v. Minnesota, --- U.S. ---, 128 S.Ct. 1029, 1035 (2008), the Court held that 
the federal rule of retroactivity adopted in Tearrue v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), does not 
limit state courts from applying a broader rule of retroactivity even if the new rule of law 
is based upon the federal Constitution. 
Fields has stated the issue on appeal as follows: 
Whether in light of Idaho's long history of jury participation in 
sentencing in capital cases, the fundamental role which the right to jury 
fact-finding plays in our conception of justice, and the Court's consistent 
use of Idaho's established test for determining which new court decisions 
should be given retroactive effect, Ring should be applied retroactively to 
provide Petitioner a remedy for the indisputable denial of his 
constitutionally guaranteed right to a jury trial on whether the facts 
necessary to make him eligible for a death sentence existed. 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state wishes to rephrase the issue on appeal as follows: 
Because his successive post-conviction petition is governed by I.C. 5 19-2719, 
which does not contain a provision for the retroactive application of new rules of law, has 
Fields failed to establish the district court had jurisdiction to grant him post-conviction 
relief based upon the dictates of Ring v. Arizona, and because he has failed to meet the 
dictates of I.C. $ 19-2719, must his appeal be dismissed? 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Was Without Jurisdiction To Grant Field's Post-Conviction Relief 
Because I.C. 6 19-2719 Does Not Grant The Courts Jurisdiction To Retroactively Apply 
New Rules Of Law In Cases On Collateral Review 
A. Introduction 
While Fields' successive petition raises eight claims, he has challenged the district 
court's decision with respect to only the first claim - the right to have a jury find the 
statutory aggravating factors - which is based upon Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 
(2002). Relying upon principles of "hndarnental fairness," Fields contends he is entitled 
to the retroactive application of &. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-10.) Fields also contends 
he is entitled to the retroactive application of Rinn based upon State v. Whitman, 96 
Idaho 489, 531 P.2d 579 (1975), which applied a three-prong retroactivity test adopted by 
the Supreme Court in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), but was abandoned by 
the Supreme Court in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987) and T e a ~ u e  v. Lane, 489 
U.S. 288 (1989). (Appellant's brief, pp.10-24.) Fields further contends this Court should 
not adopt the doctrine for purposes of retroactivity analysis, but continue to 
follow the three-prong Linkletter test. (Appellant's brief, pp.24-30.) Apparently 
recognizing his case is governed by I.C. 5 19-2719, Fields also raises four constitutional 
and statutory challenges to I.C. 5 19-2719(5)(c). (Appellant's brief, pp.30-37.) 
Idaho Code 5 19-2719 imposes a jurisdictional bar which prohibits the courts 
from granting relief stemming from successive capital post-conviction claims unless the 
claim fits the narrow exception of I.C. 5 19-2719(5). Because I.C. 5 19-2719 does not 
provide an exception for the retroactive application of new rules of constitutional law, the 
district court was without jurisdiction to grant post-conviction relief and this Court is 
without jurisdiction to reverse the district court. Therefore, the state expressly moves this 
Court to dismiss Fields' appeal. Alternatively, should this Court conclude LC. § 19- 
2719(5) does not prohibit the retroactive application of Rinp, because of the difficulties 
and inconsistent results associated with the three-prong Linkletter test, this Court should 
adopt the TeaRue rule of retroactivity. Finally, even under Linkletter, Fields has failed to 
meet his burden under the three-prong test. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The Idaho Supreme Court recently articulated the standard of review in appeals 
stemming from the denial of post-conviction relief in capital successive petitions. "When 
this Court is presented with a motion to dismiss by the State based upon the provisions of 
Idaho Code 19-2719, the proper standard of review this Court should utilize is to 
directly address the motion, determine whether or not the requirements of section 19- 
271 9 have been met, and rule accordingly." Hairston v. State, 144 Idaho 5 1,55, 156 P.3d 
552 (2007) (quoting Creech v. State, 137 Idaho 573, 575, 51 P.3d 387 (2002)), remanded 
on other grounds Hairston v. Idaho, --- U.S. ---, 128 S.Ct. 1442 (2008)). 
C. Because Idaho Code 6 19-2719(5) Does Not Have An Exception For New Rules 
Of Federal Constitutional Law, Fields' Appeal Must Be Dismissed 
1 .  Fields' Successive Post-Conviction Petition Is Governed BY I.C. 6 19- 
2719 
Idaho Code $ 19-2719 sets forth special appellate and post-conviction procedures 
in all capital cases. Capital post-conviction proceedings, like non-capital post-conviction 
proceedings which are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act 
(UPCPA), are civil in nature and governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
P i m t o  v. State, 127 Idaho 469, 470, 903 P.2d 58 (1995). Idaho Code 19-2719 does 
not eliminate the applicability of the UPCPA in capital cases, but acts as a modifier and 
"supersedes the UPCPA to the extent that their provisions conflict." McKinnev v. State, 
133 Idaho 695,700, 992 P.2d 144 (1999); Pizzuto, 127 Idaho at 470. 
Specifically, I.C. 5 19-2719 provides a capital defendant one opportunity to raise 
all challenges to the conviction and sentence in a post-conviction relief petition which 
must be filed within forty-two days after entry of judgment. State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 
795, 806, 820 P.2d 665 (1991). The only exception is provided in I.C. 5 19-2719(5), 
which permits a successive petition "in those unusual cases where it can be demonstrated 
that the issues raised were not known and reasonably could not have been known within 
the time frame allowed by the statute." Id, 120 Idaho at 807. If a capital defendant fails 
to comply with the specific requirements of I.C. 5 19-2719, including the specified time 
limits, the issues are "deemed to have [been] waived" and "[tlhe courts of Idaho shall 
have no power to consider any such claims for relief as have been so waived or grant any 
such relief." I.C. 5 19-271 9(5); McKinney, 133 Idaho at 700. 
A capital defendant who brings a successive petition for post-conviction relief has 
a "heightened burden and must make a prima facie showing that issues raised in that 
petition fit within the narrow exception provided by the statute." Pizzuto, 127 Idaho at 
471. Even if the petitioner can demonstrate the claims were not known or could not 
reasonably have been known, I.C. 3 19-2719(5)(a) details the additional requirements that 
must be met before the successive petition may be heard: 
An allegation that a successive post-conviction petition may be 
heard because of the applicability of the exception herein for issues that 
were not known or could not reasonably have been known shall not be 
considered unless the applicant shows the existence of such issues by (i) a 
precise statement of the issue or issues asserted together with (ii) material 
facts stated under oath or affirmation by credible persons with first hand 
knowledge that would support the issue or issues asserted. A pleading that 
fails to make a showing of excepted issues supported by material facts, or 
which is not credible, must be summarily dismissed. 
I.C. 5 19-2719(5)(a). Failure to meet the requirements of I.C. 5 19-2719(5)(a) mandates 
dismissal of the successive post-conviction petition. Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 289- 
Additionally, claims which were not known or which could not have reasonably 
been known within forty-two days of judgment "must be asserted within a reasonable 
time after they are known or reasonably could have been known." Paz v. State, 123 
Idaho 758, 760, 852 P.2d 1355 (1993); McKinney, 133 Idaho at 701. If the petitioner 
fails to comply with each of the requirements detailed in I.C. 5 19-2719(5), the petition 
must be summarily dismissed. I.C. 5 19-2719(5) specifically provides: 
If the defendant fails to apply for relief as provided in this section 
and within the time limits specified, he shall be deemed to have waived 
such claims for relief as were known, or reasonably should have been 
known. The courts of Idaho shall have no power to consider any such 
claims for relief as have been so waived or grant any such relief. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208, 213, 766 P.2d 678 (1988), the Idaho Supreme 
Court discussed the purpose and policy behind the passage of I.C. 3 19-2719: 
The underlying legislative purpose behind the statute stated the need to 
expeditiously conclude criminal proceedings and recognized the use of 
dilatory tactics by those sentenced to death to "thwart their sentences." 
The statute's purpose is to "avoid such abuses of legal process by 
requiring that all collateral claims for relief . . . be consolidated in one 
proceeding. . . ." Wehold that the legislature's determination that it was 
necessary to reduce the interminable delay in capital cases is a rational 
basis for the imposition of the 42-day time limit set for I.C. 5 19-2719. 
The legislature has identified the problem and attempted to remedy it with 
a statutory scheme that is rationally related to the legitimate legislative 
purpose of expediting constitutionally imposed sentences. 
The United States Supreme Court has specifically approved requiring a criminal 
defendant to present all of his collateral claims in a single post-conviction proceeding. In 
Murch v. Mottram, 409 U.S. 41 (1972), the Court, discussing federal habeas corpus 
proceedings which prohibit piecemeal litigation by requiring that all claims be brought in 
a single petition for a writ of habeas corpus, explained the respective states can employ a 
similar procedure for post-conviction relief procedures. The Court concluded: 
There can be no doubt that States may likewise provide, as Maine 
has done, that a prisoner seeking post-conviction relief must assert all 
known constitutional claims in a single proceeding. Indeed, the Court of 
Appeals agreed that the Maine statutory scheme was an "orderly 
procedure of the state courts," as that term is used in Fay v. Noia, [372 
U.S. 391, 438, 83 S. Ct. 822, 849, 9 L. Ed. 2d 837 (1963)l. No prisoner 
has a right either under the Federal Constitution or under 28 U.S.C. 5 2241 
to insist upon piecemeal colIateral attack on a presumptively valid 
criminal conviction in the face of such a statutory provision. 
Id. at 45-46. -
Idaho Code 5 19-2719 also has a great deal of interplay with federal habeas law. 
The ability of a state to ensure its judgments cany a measure of finality rather than being 
subject to repetitive federal attack depends in substantial measure on the regular and 
consistent enforcement of state procedural rules and bars. Addressing the interplay 
between state procedural bars and federal review, in Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 
578, 587 (1988), the Supreme Court refused to honor a state procedural bar, explaining: 
[W]e consider whether that bar provides an adequate and independent 
state ground for the refusal to vacate petitioner's sentence. "[Wle have 
consistently held that the question of when and how defaults in 
compliance with state procedural rules can preclude our consideration of a 
federal question is itself a federal question." Henry v. Mississippi, 379 
U.S. 443, 447, [85 S. Ct. 564, 567, 13 L. Ed. 2d 4081 (1965). "[A] state 
procedural ground is not 'adequate' unless the procedural rule is 'strictly 
or regularly followed.' Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 149, [84 
S. Ct. 1734, 1736, 12 L. Ed. 2d 7661 (1964)." Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 
U.S. 255,262-263, 102 S. Ct. 2421, 2426-2427,72 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1982); 
see Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. at 447-448, 85 S. Ct. at 567-568. We 
find no evidence that the procedural bar relied on by the Mississippi 
Supreme Court here has been consistently or regularly applied. Rather, 
the weight of Mississippi law is to the contrary. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has historically followed the requirements of I.C. 5 19- 
2719, strictly and regularly dismissing successive capital post-conviction relief claims 
because of petitioners' failure to meet the narrow exception of I.C. 5 19-2719(5). See 
Creech v. State, 137 Idaho 573, 51 P.3d 387 (2002); Porter v. State, 136 Idaho 257, 32 
P.3d 151 (2001); Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573,21 P.3d 895 (2001); Rhoades v. State, 135 
Idaho 299, 17 P.3d 243 (2000); Paradis v. State, 128 Idaho 223, 912 P.2d 110 (1996); 
Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469, 903 P.2d 58 (1995); Lankford v. State, 127 Idaho 100, 
897 P.2d 991 (1995); Paz v. State, 123 Idaho 758, 852 P.2d 1355 (1993); Fetterlv v. 
&, 121 Idaho 417, 825 P.2d 1073 (1991). The Court has also historically followed the 
requirements of I.C. 5 19-2719, strictly and regularly affirming the district courts' 
dismissal of successive capital post-conviction claims because of petitioners' failure to 
meet the narrow exceptions of I.C. 5 19-2719(5), including the pleading requirements of 
I.C. $ 5  19-2719(5)(a) and (b). See Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 17 P.3d 230 (2000); 
Pizzuto v. State, 134 Idaho 793, 10 P.3d 742 (2000); Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 8 
P.3d 636 (2000); McKinnev v. State, 133 Idaho 695,992 P.2d 144 (1999). 
2. Fields' Appeal Must Be Dismissed Because The Claims In His Successive 
Petition DO Not Fall Within The Exception Contained In I.C. 6 19-2719(5] 
As detailed above, capital defendants are provided only one opportunity to raise 
all factual and legal challenges to their convictions and sentences, which must be filed 
within forty-two days after entry of judgment. Rhoades, 120 Idaho at 806. The only 
exception is for those claims which were not known and reasonably could not have been 
known within the time frame allowed by the statute. Id. 
Fields failed to raise the issue regarding juries finding statutory aggravators in his 
initial direct and post-conviction appeal. Nevertheless, the claim clearly was known or 
reasonably could have been known at the time Fields filed his initial post-conviction case. 
In I3offman v. State, 142 Idaho 27, 30, 121 P.3d 958 (2005), the petitioner previously 
raised the claim of jury participation in a capital sentencing in his initial consolidated 
appeal. Therefore, the claim in his successive petition was "clearly known and asserted 
in prior proceedings." Id. As explained in Hairston, 144 Idaho at 58, this Court has 
dismissed & claims in successive post-conviction petitions because "the claims do not 
fall within the exceptions of I.C. 5 19-2719 and are therefore barred." Fields' & claim 
fails to meet the only exception in I.C. 5 19-2719(5) that permits the filing of claims in a 
successive petition. Therefore, unless this Court overrules Hoffman and Hairston, Fields' 
appeal must be dismissed. 
Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 8 P.3d 636 (2000), does not salvage Fields' claim. 
In w, the state asserted a prosecutorial misconduct claim was procedurally barred 
under I.C. 5 19-2719(5) because "the identical issue" had been previously raised before 
the court. Id. at 642. Rejecting the state's argument, the court explained: 
We reject the State's theory that Sivak has waived this claim for 
relief merely because he raised the issue in his first post-conviction 
petition. As Sivak concedes, this petition presents not a new claim but 
new evidence supporting an old claim. Applying this rule as the State 
requests would result in Idaho courts being unable to entertain evidence of 
actual innocence in successive post-conviction petitions, even where the 
evidence was clearly material or had been suppressed by prosecutorial 
misconduct. We must be vigilant against imposing a rule of law that will 
work injustice in the name of judicial efficiency. 
Id. -
was premised upon the presentation of additional evidence supporting an 
old claim, not a new rule of law from the Supreme Court. The court was concerned that a 
rule preventing the presentation of additional or new evidence supporting an old claim 
could prevent the Court from addressing claims of actual innocence. However, a new 
rule of law does not raise concerns of actual innocence, but merely provides a mechanism 
for death sentenced murderers, who have been legally and constitutionally convicted and 
sentenced based upon then existing law, to skirt their convictions or death sentences 
based upon a new technicality which the original courts never envisioned; it does not 
involve actual innocence. 
Fields contends this Court should apply the three-prong Linkletter test for 
determining whether F.&g is retroactive in cases on collateral review in Idaho. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.10-24.) Contrary to Fields' contention that this Court has 
"consistently employed precedent requiring the use of a three-factor test to settle 
questions of retroactivity" (Appellant's brief, p.10), and that, "[ulntil Danforth, the sole 
exception to this Court's use of the three-factor test to determine a new decision's 
retroactive effect was where a rule required by the federal constitution announced in a 
United States Supreme Court decision was at issue" (Appellant's brief, p.12), this Court 
has not consistently applied the three-prong Linkletter test and has never applied the 
three-prong test in capital cases. Rather, this Court has applied I.C. 5 19-2719 to address 
whether Idaho law permits the retroactive application of new rules of law raised in 
successive post-conviction petitions. 
In Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417, 418, 825 P.2d 1073 (1991), the petitioner 
contended, "the Charboneau interpretation of I.C. 3 19-2515 was not a claim that was 
known or should have been known" when he filed his initial post-conviction petition.6 
Because Charboneau had not been issued prior to the filing of his initial post-conviction 
petition, Fetterly contended the claim was not known and reasonably could not have been 
known when he filed his initial petition, and that it should be given retroactive 
application. The Idaho Supreme Court. recognized Charboneau was issued after Fetterly 
filed his first post-conviction petition, but expressly reframed the issue, stating, "the 
claim that the Charboneau interpretation of 1.C. 3 19-2515 was not known or should not 
have been known misses the real issue. The real issue is whether Charboneau applies 
retroactively to cases that were final at the time of its issuance." Fetterly, 121 Idaho at 
418. Relying upon Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987), the court recognized, "the 
distinction between defendants whose cases were final before the issuance of 
Charboneau and those whose cases were not is a valid distinction." Id. at 418-19. Based 
upon that distinction, the court refused to retroactively apply Charboneau, concluding, 
"the Charboneau interpretation of I.C. 19-2515 does not apply to the present case 
because the present case was final prior to the issuance of Charboneau." Id. 
In dissent, Justice Bistline addressed the three-pronged Linkletter test and noted 
Idaho had used the test "in both direct appeals and collateral attacks to determine the 
retroactive effect of cases." Fetterly, 121 Idaho at 420 (Bistline, J., dissenting). Justice 
Bistline explained the Griffith test requires new constitutional rules to be applied 
In State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299 (1989), the supreme court 
concluded, "the trial court may sentence the defendant to death, only if the trial court 
finds that all the mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the gravity of each of the 
aggravating circumstances found and make imposition of death unjust." 
retroactively in criminal cases "to all cases pending on direct review or which are not yet 
final" and did not apply to cases on collateral review. Id. Because Griffith addressed 
only retroactivity in direct review cases involving new constitutional rules, Justice 
Bistline advocated for a continuation of the Linkletter three-prong test for new rules of 
law in cases on collateral review. Id. at 420-21. However, the majority rejected Justice 
Bistline's position when it relied upon I.C. $ 19-2719(5) and Griffith, concluding, "the 
Charboneau interpretation of I.C. $ 19-2515 does not apply to the present case because 
the present case was final prior to the issuance of Charboneau." Id. at 419. Obviously, 
Charboneau was a new state rule, not "a new rule required by the federal constitution 
announced in a United States Supreme Court decision." 
In Stuart v. State, 128 Idaho 436, 438, 914 P.2d 933 (1996), the supreme court 
applied the principles established in Fetterly when it rejected Stuart's request for 
retroactive application of the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in State v. Tribe, 123 Idaho 
721, 852 P.2d 87 (1993), which reversed a murder conviction because the jury was not 
instructed on second-degree murder by torture. Relying upon -, the supreme court 
concluded, because Stuart's case was final when Tribe was issued, the court was 
precluded from applying Tribe retroactively. m, 128 Idaho at 438. 
In Butler v. State, 129 Idaho 899, 901, 935 P.2d 162 (1997), the petitioner sought 
the retroactive application of State v. Townsend, 124 Idaho 881, 865 P.2d 972 (1993), 
which held that hands, other body parts, or appendages may not by themselves constitute 
deadly weapons under the aggravated assault and aggravated battery statutes. Again, 
relying upon Fetterly, this Court concluded Townsend would not be retroactively applied 
because the petitioner's direct appeal was final. &, 129 Idaho at 901-02. Tribe and 
Townsend were obviously new state rules, not "a new rule required by the federal 
constitution announced in a United States Supreme Court decision," as Fields contends. 
The three-prong Linkletter test was also implicitly rejected in State v. Card, 121 
Idaho 425, 825 P.2d 1081 (1991), in which the Idaho Supreme Court applied Payne v. 
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), which overruled in part, Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 
496 (1987). Justice Bistline, again in dissent, contended that under Whitman, 
should not be applied retroactively, Card, 121 Idaho at 461-63 (Bistline, J., dissenting), 
which this Court implicitly rejected when it applied without any reference to the 
three-prong Linkletter test. 
Since Griffith, this Court has declined to retroactively apply new rules of law to 
cases on collateral review in any criminal or capital case.7 In fact, Justice Bistline has 
repeatedly criticized this Court for its decisions regarding the retroactive application of 
new rules of law in criminal cases. In addition to those cited above, in State v. Galleaos, 
120 Idaho 894, 900-01, 821 P.2d 949 (1991) (Bistline, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting), Justice Bistline again criticized the majority for refusing to address the three- 
prong Linkletter test in a direct review case that retroactively applied California v. 
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991). Justice Bistline detailed cases in which this Court had 
addressed the retroactivity issue in criminal cases and noted the Court was again 
' State v. Adair, 145 Idaho 514, ---, 181 P.3d 440, 443 (2008), is not contrary. While 
&I.& cited State v. Tipton, 99 Idaho 670, 672, 587 P.2d 305 (1978), it was only in the 
context of whether any retroactive analysis should be applied to the issue raised, not 
whether the three-prong test should be applied. As explained in m, 99 Idaho at 672, 
the question of retroactivity "arises when the rule announced in the more recent case 
overrules a precedent upon which parties may have justifiably relied." Because the 
question in was whether some prior precedent had been overruled, it was 
appropriate for this Court to cite the rule from =. Because this Court concluded past 
precedent had not been overruled, any contention that the Court's citation to Tioton 
establishes the three-prong Linkletter test is still viable after Griffith is simply incorrect. 
retroactively applying a new rule of law without addressing the three-prong Linkletter 
test. Gallegos, 120 Idaho at 900-01. It is clear that Griffith changed Idaho's retroactive 
test in criminal cases and I.C. 8 19-2719 changed the rule in capital cases. 
Fields' reliance upon civil cases is also unavailing. As explained in American 
Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 197 (1990) (Thomas, J., with three 
justices concurring), four Justices declined to extend Griffith to civil cases, concluding, 
"there are important distinctions between the retroactive applications of civil and criminal 
decisions that make the Grijjjth rationale far less compelling in the civil sphere." 
Recognizing Griffith's adoption of a per se rule of retroactivity expanded procedural 
protections to criminal defendants because it allowed the retroactive application of new 
rules of law in any criminal case that was still pending, the Court concluded, "[tlhere are 
no analogous reasons for adopting a per se rule of retroactivity in the civil context 
[because] [elither party before a court may benefit from the application of the Chevron 
Oil rule," which is similar to the Linkletter test. American Trucking, 496 U.S. at 198. 
While the Supreme Court has subsequently concluded Griffith is the proper retroactive 
test for new rules of federal law in civil cases, Harper v. Virginia Deut. of Taxation, 509 
U.S. 86, 97 (1993), the Idaho Supreme Court has apparently concluded there is a 
distinction between civil and criminal cases because the court has continued to apply the 
three-part m t e r 1 W h i t m a n  test to civil cases. See State v. Hoooer, 145 Idaho 139, 
141 n.l ,  176 P.3d 91 1 (2007) (citing and Idaho criminal cases in which the 
GriffithlHar~er test for retroactivity was applied to Idaho criminal cases). 
More importantly, as detailed above, there simply is not an exception under I.C. Cj 
19-2719 providing for the retroactive application of either new state or federal rules of 
law. Because there is no exception for the retroactive application of new rules of law in 
capital cases, Fields' claims fail, were properly dismissed by the district court, and his 
appeal must be dismissed by this Court. 
3. Fields Has Failed To Establish I.C. 6 19-2719(5)(c) Violates Either The 
State Or Federal Constitutions Or Idaho Code 
a. Introduction 
Fields raises four constitutional and statutory challenges to I.C. $ 19-2719(5)(c), 
including: (1) Idaho's separation of powers doctrine; (2) I.C. $ 73-101 bars the 
retroactive application of I.C. § 19-2719(5)(c); (3) due process and equal protection; and 
(4) violation of the federal constitutional guarantee of a "republican form of state 
government" under Article 4, $4 of the Constitution. (Appellant's brief, pp.30-37.) 
Initially, it must be noted the state is not relying upon I.C. $ 19-2719(5)(c), but 
upon I.C. 19-2719(5), which does not provide an exception for the retroactive 
application of new rules of law, as established by this Court in Fetterlv. As detailed 
below, I.C. $ 19-2719(5)(c) is merely a codification of what this Court concluded in 
Fetterlv. However, to the extent Fields converts the same arguments to a challenge 
against I.C. $ 19-27 19(5), his arguments still fail. 
b. Fields' "Republican Form Of State Government" Issue Is Being 
Raised For The First Time On Appeal 
Fields' fourth basis - violation of the federal constitutional guarantee of a 
"republican form of state government" under Article 4, $4 of the Constitution - is being 
raised for the first time on appeal. Therefore, this Court is precluded from addressing his 
argument. Porter v. State, 136 Idaho 257,262,32 P.3d 151 (2001 j. 
c. I.C. 6 19-2719 Does Not Violate The Idaho Constitution's 
Separation Of Powers Doctrine 
Fields contends I.C. § 19-2719 violates Idaho's separation of powers doctrine. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.30-33.) While Idaho has not directly addressed this issue, it has 
been addressed in the context of habeas corpus. In Mahaffey v. State, 87 Idaho 228,230, 
392 P.2d 279 (1964), the Idaho Supreme Court explained that because the writ of habeas 
corpus is expressly recognized in Idaho's constitution, "the writ is not a statutory 
remedy." The court concluded, "While the legislature (absent certain contingencies) is 
without power to abridge this remedy secured by the Constitution, it may add to the 
efficacy of the writ. Statutes are usually enacted for this purpose and should be construed 
so as to promote the effectiveness of the proceeding." Id. Addressing the enactment of 
the UPCPA, the supreme court concluded the UPCPA is "an expansion of the Writ of 
Habeas Corpus." Dionne v. State, 93 Idaho 235,237,459 P.2d 101 7 (1969). 
Because the UPCPA is an expansion of the writ of habeas corpus and the 
legislature is not barred from adding to the efficacy of the writ, it naturally follows that 
I.C. 5 19-2719 does not unduly restrict the district court's jurisdiction in violation of the 
separation of powers doctrine. Rather, I.C. 5 19-2719 merely establishes the parameters 
in which relief may be granted when a successive post-conviction petition has been filed. 
As explained in Kirkland v. Blaine County Medical Ctr., 134 Idaho 464, 471, 4 P.3d 
Because it is properly within the power of the legislature to establish 
statutes of limitations, statutes of repose, create new causes of action, and 
otherwise modify the common law without violating separation of powers 
principles, it necessarily follows that the legislature also has the power to 
limit remedies available to plaintiffs without violating the separation of 
powers doctrine. 
Because the legislature has the power to limit the remedies available to plaintiffs, 
it necessarily has the power to limit the remedies of capital petitioners in seeking post- 
conviction relief. Fields has failed to establish I.C. § 19-2719 results in a constitutional 
violation under the separation of powers doctrine. 
d. The Legislature Has Stated Its Clear Intent That I.C. 6 19-2719(5) 
Be Amlied Retroactivelv In Capital Cases 
The legislature clearly explained it meant for I.C. 5 19-2719(5) to be applied 
retroactively. Idaho law "prohibits the retroactive application of newly passed 
legislation." Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 804, 839 P.2d 1215 (1992) (citing I.C. 5 
73-10]), However, I.C. § 73-101 provides an exception when the legislature declares its 
intent to make a new rule of law retroactive. Id. When the legislature enacted I.C. § 19- 
2719 in 1984, it included the relevant portion of section ( 9 ,  which reads as follows, "If 
the defendant fails to apply for relief as provided in this section and within the time limits 
specified, he shall be deemed to have waived such claims for relief as were known, or 
reasonably should have been known. The courts of Idaho shall have no power to 
consider any such claim for relief as have been so waived or grant any such relief." 1984 
Idaho Sess. Laws 389. This portion of the statute is the same even today. At the time 
I.C. § 19-2719 was passed, the legislature also expressly stated: 
This act shall apply to all cases in which capital sentences were 
imposed on or prior to the effective date of this act but which have not 
been carried out, and to all capital cases arising after the effective date of 
this act. 
1984 ldaho Sess. Laws 390. 
This language clearly states the legislature's intent to make I.C. $ 19-2719(5) 
retroactive to all capital cases. Because of this language, Fields' argument regarding the 
retroactivity of I.C. $ 19-2719(5) fails. 
Second, Fields' argument also fails with respect to I.C. $ 19-2719(5), and 
subsection (c), which was enacted in 1995, 1995 Idaho Sess. Laws 597, because Fields 
filed his successive petitions after & was issued in 2002. Because the state is not 
relying upon a statute or a portion of a statute enacted after the successive petition was 
filed, I.C. $ 73-101 has no application to Fields' case. See Matthews, 122 Idaho at 804. 
e. Idaho Code 6 19-27196) Does Not Violate Fields' Due Process Or 
Equal Protection Rights 
Fields contends I.C. 5 19-2719(5)(c) violates his equal protection and due process 
rights. (Appellant's brief, pp.33-36.) In State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208, 21 1-13, 766 P.2d 
678 (1988), the court expressly held I.C. $ 19-2719 does not violate equal protection. In 
State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 795, 806, 820 P.2d 665 (1991), the court expressly 
concluded I.C. 5 19-2719 does not violate due process. The Idaho Supreme Court has 
repeatedly affirmed both of these cases. See Hairston v. State, 144 Idaho 51, 55, 156 
P.3d 552 (2007); Lankford v. State, 127 Idaho 100, 102, 897 P.2d 991 (1995); State v. 
Hoffman, 123 Idaho 638, 647, 851 P.2d 934 (1993); State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 430- 
3 1, 825 P.2d 1081 (1991); State v. Rhoades, 121 Idaho 63, 72, 822 P.2d 960 (1991); 
v Pa7 118 Idaho 542, 559, 798 P.2d 1 (1990); State v. Fetterly, 115 Idaho 231, 235-36, u,
766 P.2d 701 (1988). Because Fields has failed to even cite these cases, he obviously has 
failed to provide any argument as to why they are not controlling or should be 
reconsidered. 
4. Because The Claim In Fields' Successive Petition Seeks The Retroactive 
Application Of A New Rule Of Law In Violation Of I.C. 6 19-2719(5)(cl 
His Awweal Must Be Dismissed 
As detailed above, in 1995, the Idaho Legislature enacted I.C. $ 19-2719(5)(c), 
which expressly states, "A successive post-conviction pleading asserting the exception 
shall be deemed facially insufficient to the extent it seeks retroactive application of new 
rules of law." 1995 Idaho Sess. Laws 594. Idaho Code $ 19-2719(5)(c) is based upon 
the Court's decision in -, which discussed the question of retroactivity. While 
Fetterly did not expressly cite I.C. $ 19-2719(5), the legislature obviously wanted to 
ensure Justice Bistline's dissent did not result in a judicially created exception permitting 
the retroactive application of new rules of law in violation of the legislature's clear intent 
to limit claims in successive petitions to those which were not known and could not 
reasonably have been known when a capital petitioner's first petition was filed. 
Fields does not dispute his claims are based upon the retroactive application of a 
new rule of law, but challenges the statute, contending it violates: (1) Idaho's separation 
of powers doctrine; (2) I.C. $ 73-101 and the retroactive application of I.C. $ 19- 
2719(5)(c); (3) due process and equal protection; and (4) the federal constitutional 
guarantee of a "republican form of state government" under Article 4, $4 of the 
Constitution (Appellant's brief, pp.30-37), which the state has addressed above. 
Because I.C. $ 19-2719(5)(c) is nothing more than an affirmation and codification 
of I;etterlv, there is no significant difference in the analysis associated with I.C. $ 19- 
2719(5). However, should this Court determine subsection (c) is more than a codification 
of Fetterly or that Fields' claims are not controlled by Fetterly, the state expressly relies 
upon the prohibition of I.C. $ 19-2719(5)(c), and requests that his appeal be dismissed. 
D. Because The Three-Prong Linkletter Test Is Difficult To Apply And Causes 
Inconsistent Results, This Court Should Adopt The Teame Test For New Rules 
Of Law Arising In Collateral Challenges In Criminal Cases 
As explained in Danforth, 128 S.Ct. at 1036, the Supreme Court first addressed 
the issue of retroactivity in Linkletter, which involved only the question of whether the 
dictates of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), would be retroactively applied to cases 
that were already final. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 621-22. Afler reviewing "the history and 
theory of the problem presented," id, at 622-26, and, based upon that review, concluding, 
"the Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect," id, at 629, a rule was 
adopted requiring the Court to "look to the purpose of the [new] rule; the reliance placed 
upon the [prior] doctrine; and the effect on the administration of justice of a retrospective 
application of [the new rule]." Id. at 636. The three-prong test was subsequently applied 
to cases which had not become final, but were still pending review, in Johnson v. New 
a, 384 U.S. 719,732 (1966). 
Nine years later in Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19, 25, 523 P.2d 1365 (1974), 
the Idaho Supreme Court reviewed Linkletter and concluded the three-prong test would 
be applied to a case involving "a major change in a host's liability in a negligently caused 
automobile accident" "to past, pending and future cases." The Linkletter three-prong test 
was applied in an Idaho criminal case the following year in Whitman, 96 Idaho at 491 
During the succeeding years, "application of the Linkletter standards produced 
strikingly divergent results" resulting in the "eventual demise of the Linkletter standard" 
in cases pending on direct review because it was "unprincipled and inequitable." 
Danforth, 128 S.Ct. at 1037. Therefore, in Griffith, 479 U.S. at 328, the Court abandoned 
the Linkletter standard in cases on direct review and concluded, "a new rule for the 
conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or 
federal, pending on direct review or not yet final." 
However, it was not until Teague that the Court abandoned the Linkletter standard 
in federal habeas cases, stating, "The Linkletter standard also led to unfortunate disparity 
in the treatment of similarly situated defendants on collateral review," which was based 
upon two factors, "failure to treat retroactivity as a threshold,question and the Linkletter 
standard's inability to account for the nature and hnction of collateral review." Teapue, 
489 U.S. at 305-06. The Court concluded, "commentators have had a veritable field day 
with the Linkletter standard, with much of the discussion being more than mildly 
negative." Id. at 303. Relying upon Justice Harlan's concurrence in Mackev v. United 
States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971), the Court recognized habeas corpus has always been a 
"collateral remedy, providing an avenue for upsetting judgments that have become 
otherwise final. It is not designed as a substitute for direct review." Teaque, 489 U.S. at 
306 (emphasis in original) (quoting Mackev, 401 U.S. at 682-83 (concurring in 
judgments in part and dissenting in part)). Therefore, the Court developed a three-step 
process to determine when new rules of law should be applied retroactively in federal 
habeas: 
First, [the court] determines the date upon which the defendant's 
conviction became final. Second, [the court] must [s]uwe[y] the legal 
landscape as it then existed, and determine whether a state court 
considering [the defendant's] claims at the time his conviction became 
final would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the 
rule [he] seeks was required by the Constitution. Finally, if the court 
determines that the habeas petitioner seeks the benefit of a new rule, the 
court must consider whether the relief sought falls within one of the two 
narrow exceptions to nonretroactivity. 
Lambrix v. Sinaletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527 (1997) (internal quotes and citations omitted). 
While the Supreme Court has determined the States are not mandated to apply 
Teague to new rules of law, Danforth, 128 S.Ct. at 1041, many of the problems 
associated with the unbridled Linkletter standard exist in state collateral proceedings, 
resulting in a majority of States choosing to adopt m s  standard for determining the 
retroactive application of new rules of law in cases on collateral review. See Smart v. 
, 146 P.3d 15, 28 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006) ("several of the state courts that have 
recognized that they are not bound by the Teague retroactivity rule have nevertheless 
adopted the Teague rule as a matter of state law - either because they were troubled by 
the difficulties posed by the Linkletter rule, or simply because they wished to bring their 
state law into conformity with federal law on this subject"). in Pailin v. Vose, 603 A.2d 
738, 742 (R.I. 1992), the court adopted m, abandoning the confusion from the 
Linkletter standard. See also Carmichael v. State, 927 A.2d 1172, 1179 (Me. 2007). 
Additionally, as recognized in Daniels v. State, 561 N.E.2d 487, 489 (Ind. 1990), 
some states have adopted the Teanue standard "[b]ecause the purposes for which [the] 
Court affords the remedy of post-conviction relief are substantially similar to those for 
which the federal writ of habeas corpus is made available." In People v. Flowers, 561 
N.E.2d 674, 682 (Ill. 1990), the court adopted the Teaaue standard for retroactivity 
analysis in post-conviction cases, focusing upon the interests of finality. See also 
v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 749 (Del. 1990). 
Perhaps more importantly, a trend has developed wherein the States have adopted 
the Teanue standard. For example, as recently as 2006, Colorado expressly abandoned 
the Linkletter test and adopted m, "for reasons of uniformity and compliance with 
current Supreme Court precedent, and because Teague meets the underlying goals of 
Crim. P. 35(c) collateral attacks," which focus upon a "dual purpose: to prevent 
constitutional injustice and to bring finality to judgment." Edwards v. People, 129 P.3d 
977,982-83 (Colo. 2006). In adopting m, the Colorado Supreme Court noted it was 
joining the ranks of a majority of states. Id. (citing Windom v. State, 886 So.2d 915, 943 
(Fla. 2004) (noting twenty-eight state supreme courts and the District of Columbia had 
adopted the Teague test at that point in time) (citing cases)). In fact, Windom noted only 
six state supreme courts have decided against adopting W s  retroactivity standards 
to new rules of federal constitutional law. Windom, 886 So.2d at 915 (citing cases). 
Should this Court conclude I.C. 19-2719(5) is not controlling regarding the 
retroactive application of m, the Court should follow the majority of states and adopt 
the Teague standard, which will provide uniformity in Idaho's application of new rules of 
criminal law and eliminate a confusing and unbridled standard that was abandoned years 
ago by the Supreme Court and a majority of states. See Flowers, 561 N.E.2d at 682 
("The Teague test is helphl and concise and in it we have the pronouncement of the 
Supreme Court on an issue nearly identical to the one before us"). Post-conviction cases 
in Idaho, like federal habeas case, are collateral in nature and both are "collateral attacks 
that are not meant to be a substitute for direct review." Id.; compare Gilpin-Grubb v. 
m, 138 Idaho 76, 81, 57 P.3d 787 (2002) ("A post-conviction action is not a substitute 
for and does not supplant a direct appeal from the conviction or sentence"). Finally, 
"[tlhe application of a constitutional rule not in existence at the time a conviction became 
final seriously undermines the principle of finality which is essential to the operation of 
our criminal justice system. Without finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its 
deterrent effect." m, 585 A.2d at 749. 
E. Even Under The Three-Prong Linkletter Test Fields Has Failed To Establish Ring 
Should Be Retroactivelv Applied 
Even if this Court applies the three-prong Linkletter test, Fields has failed to 
establish should be retroactively applied. In Idaho, the Linkletter test encompasses 
the following: "The Court must weigh: (1) The purpose of the new rule; (2) Reliance on 
the prior decisions of this Court; and (3) The effect of the new rule on the administration 
of justice." Whitman, 96 Idaho at 491. "We balance the first factor against the other two 
to determine whether to limit the retroactive application of the decision." 
Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise, 141 Idaho 168, 173, 108 P.3d 315 (2004). 
While Fields has devoted considerable space in his argument regarding the three- 
prong test (Appellant's brief, pp.10-24), he has conspicuously ignored the fact that the 
Supreme Court applied the three-prong Linkletter test in DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 
631, 633-34 (1968), and declined to retroactively apply Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 
145 (1968), which held the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial applies to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment. As explained in Duncan, "We would not assert, 
however, that every criminal trial - or any particular trial - held before a judge alone is 
unfair or that a defendant may never be as fairly treated by a judge as he would be by a 
jury." 391 U.S. at 158. Therefore, addressing the first prong, the Court concluded, "The 
values implemented by the right to jury trial would not measurably be served by requiring 
retrial of all persons convicted in the past by procedures not consistent with the Sixth 
Amendment right to jury trial." DeStefano, 392 U.S. at 634. 
Addressing the second prong, Fields contends any reliance by the state was 
misplaced because "they knew or should have known that the legislature's enactment was 
not made in reliance on guidance from the United States Supreme Court." (Appellant's 
brief, p.19.) Fields' argument is nonsensical. When this Court reviewed the question of 
whether the federal Constitution required a jury determination of statutory aggravaling 
factors, there was a plethora of Supreme Court precedent suggesting no such requirement 
was mandated. See e.g., Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989) (per curiam); Poland v. 
Arizona, 476 U.S. 147 (1986); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984); Enmund v. 
Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Proffit v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v. Georaia, 
428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
In State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 373-74, 670 P.2d 463 (1983), this Court 
carefully examined Supreme Court precedent and recognized the Supreme Court had not 
mandated jury participation in a capital sentencing. After examining additional Supreme 
Court cases in State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 902-03, 674 P.2d 396 (1983), this Court 
reaffirmed that jury participation in a capital sentencing was not required by the United 
States Supreme Court. Admittedly, in Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d 101 1, 1023-28 (9' 
Cir. 1988), the Ninth Circuit reached an opposite conclusion. However, after further 
review of Supreme Court precedent, this Court expressly rejected Adamson, concluding, 
"we are not convinced that Adamson states the requirements of the sixth amendment on 
this issue." State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 145-48, 774 P.2d 299 (1989). 
Of course, the Supreme Court's precedent culminated in B, which expressly 
held the Constitution did not require a jury finding of statutory aggravating factors. 
While Walton has been overruled by m, until the Supreme Court expressly overruled 
Walton, and its preceding precedent, the Idaho Supreme Court had no basis to ignore the 
plethora of Supreme Court authority indicating the Constitution did not require a jury 
finding of statutory aggravating factors. Even the Ninth Circuit has recognized, "The 
Supreme Court has specifically directed lower courts to 'leav[e] to this Court the 
prerogative of overruling its own decisions."' Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523, 542 (9th 
Cir. 2001) (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 207 (1997)). As explained in 
DeStefano, "[Idaho] undoubtedly relied in good faith upon the past opinions of this Court 
to the effect that the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial was not applicable to [capital 
sentencings]." 392 U.S. at 634. If the Supreme Court was permitted to rely upon its 
prior precedent to conclude there was no Sixth Amendment right to jury participation in a 
capital sentencing in -, certainly the Idaho Legislature and ihe Idaho Supreme 
Court were entitled that same right. 
Addressing the third prong, Fields correctly notes the number of death-sentenced 
murderers in Idaho whose cases would be affected by Ring is less than twenty. 
(Appellant's brief, p.21.) However, even the resentencing of ten murderers would not be 
a de minimus undertaking in a capital case. As explained in Johnson v. State, 904 So.2d 
400, 41 1 n.6 (Fla. 2005), "to equate death penalty cases with cases involving lesser 
crimes and punishments would be to ignore the obvious: death penalty cases require a 
much larger investment of societal resources than the average criminal case." While 
Idaho certainly does not have the number of death-sentenced murderers as Florida, even 
the resentencing of ten would constitute an enormous undertaking, particularly 
considering the limited resources available in Idaho and her smaller counties. 
Finally, the state notes the Florida Supreme Court, using the three-prong 
Linkletter test, has expressly rejected Fields' arguments regarding &'s retroactivity, 
concluding none of the three Linkletter prongs were met. Johnson, 904 So.2d at 409-12. 
There is simply no basis for distinguishing either DeStefano or Johnson. 
Therefore, even if this Court concludes I.C. $ 19-2719(5) is not controlling regarding the 
retroactive application of Rinp, and the three-prong LinMetter test must be applied in lieu 
of m, Fields' claims fail because is not retroactive under the three-prong test. 
F. "Fundamental Fairness" Does Not Mandate The Retroactive Application of Rinx 
Fields' contends, "Fundamental fairness requires that Petitioners' unconstitutional 
sentences - unconstitutional on the very ground on which they objected at trial - be 
remedied." (Appellant's brief, p.5.) Contrary to Fields' contention, it is the retroactive 
application of Rinp that would result in an inequitable result and miscarriage of justice 
In Griffith, the Supreme Court discussed the history and equities associated with 
the question of retroactivity. Reassessing the "clear break" exception, the Court 
concluded it should not be applied to cases on direct review. Id. 479 U.S. at 326-28. In 
m, the Supreme Court again addressed the question of retroactivity, but in the 
context of collateral review. Based upon the interests of comity and finality, a plurality 
of the Court concluded new constitutional rules of criminal procedure cannot be applied 
in those cases which have become final before the new rules are announced. Id., 489 
U.S. at 308-10. Specifically addressing the issue of finality, the Court explained: 
Application of constitutional rules not in existence at the time a conviction 
became final seriously undermines the principle of finality which is 
essential to the operation of our criminal justice system. Without finality, 
the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect. The fact that 
life and liberty are at stake in criminal prosecutions shows only that 
conventional notions of finality should not have as much place in criminal 
as in civil litigation, not that they should have none. If a criminal 
judgment is ever to be final, the notion of legality must at some point 
include the assignment of final competence to determine legality. 
The costs imposed upon the States by retroactive application of 
new rules of constitutional law on habeas corpus generally far outweigh 
the benefits of this application. In many ways the application of new rules 
to cases on collateral review may be more intrusive than the enjoining of 
criminal prosecutions, for it continually forces the States to marshal 
resources in order to keep in prison defendants whose trials and appeals 
conformed to then-existing constitutional standards. . . . [Sltate courts are 
understandably frustrated when they faithfully apply existing 
constitutional law only to have a federal court discover, during a habeas 
proceeding, new constitutional demands. 
Id. at 309-1 0 (internal quotes, citations and emphasis omitted). 
Despite Fields' protestations to the contrary, & is a new constitutional rule 
whose impact on the States is exactly as described in if it is applied retroactively 
to collateral cases. For more than twenty years, Idaho's courts relied upon an abundance 
of Supreme Court precedent holding a jury finding of statutory aggravating factors is not 
mandated by the Constitution. See w, 105 Idaho at 904; m, 105 Idaho at 372-73; 
Charboneau, 116 Idaho at 145-48. To now require the application of Ring to those cases 
and potentially force the resentencing of every capital murderer would seriously 
undermine any deterrent effect associated with the death penalty. More importantly, as 
explained in m, the entire operation of the criminal justice system would be 
seriously undermined because of the destruction of the principle of finality. The costs 
associated with such a holding would be enormous, particularly in Idaho's small counties, 
and seriously outweigh any benefits associated with the new rule. More importantly, 
Ring does not involve a rule associated with actual innocence, but merely the procedure 
employed to impose a death sentence. Ring merely changed who decides whether 
statutory aggravating factors have been proven; it did not change guilt or whether the 
aggravating factors have already been proven. 
Fields' argument is particularly unavailing because several death-sentenced 
murderers may not be provided RinR relief irrespective of whether this Court concludes 
& should be retroactively applied in the seven cases before this Court because their 
cases have already been dismissed by this Court and they did not receive a reprieve from 
the Supreme Court based upon Danforth. See Row v. State, 145 Idaho 168, 177 P.3d 382 
(2008); Hoffman v. State, 142 Idaho 27, 121 P.3d 958 (2005); State v. Leavitt, 141 Idaho 
895, 120 P.3d 283 (2005); Porter v. State, 140 Idaho 780, 102 P.3d 1099 (2004); see also 
State v. Creech, S.Ct. ##29681/29682 (Idaho 2005) (granting the state's motion to 
dismiss Creech's Ring appeal in a one-page order); Sivak v. State, S.Ct. ##29662129663 
(Idaho 2005) (same as to Sivak); Rhoades v. State, S.Ct. ##29180129212 (Idaho 2005) 
(same as to Rhoades).' 
As explained in Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 639-40, "All that we decide today is that 
though the error complained of might be fundamental it is not of the nature requiring us 
to overturn all final convictions based upon it." Similarly, in Johnson, 384 U.S. at 728, 
the Court reiterated, "We here stress that the choice between retroactivity and 
nonretroactivity in no way turns on the value of the constitutional guarantee involved." 
Likewise, retroactivity in Idaho should not turn on a subjective determination of what 
constitutes "fundamental fairness." Rather, it must be based upon objective standards 
that result in a rule that can be regularly and consistently applied. 
While the state understands some of these inmates have again filed successive post- 
conviction petitions attempting to resurrect their & claims based upon Danforth, those 
petitions must be dismissed based upon I.C. 5 19-2719(5), andor res judicata because 
their claims encompass the same issues previously litigated and they are simply trying to 
relitigate the same issues already decided by the this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that Fields' appeal be dismissed or, alternatively, 
that the decision of the trial court be affirmed on appeal. 
DATED this 23rd day of July, 2009. 
Deputy ~ttornt$~eneral and 
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GENE FRANCIS STUART, ) ORDER GRANTING MOTION'TO 
) CONSOLIDATE WITH NO. 351 87 FOR 
) ORALARGUMENT Petitioner-Appellant, 
1 
v. ) Supreme Court Docket Nos. 
) 34198-2007134199-2007 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) Clearwater County District Court Nos. 
) 1981-84951 02-00443 
Respondent. ) Ref. No. 08-439 
A MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE CASE FOR ORAL ARGUMENT with attachments was 
filed by counsel for Respondent on October 28, 2008, requesting that this Court enter an order 
consolidating the oral argument in this appeal with the oral argument in Supreme Court Docket No. 
35187, McKinney v. State, which already involves the consolidation of five appellate cases. 
Thereafter, a RESPONSE TO MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE CASE FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
was filed by counsel for Appellant on November 14, 2008. The Court is fully advised; therefore, 
good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Respondent's MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE CASE FOR 
ORAL ARGUMENT be, and hereby is, GRANTED and Supreme Court Docket Nos. 34198-2007 
and 34199-2007 shall be CONSOLIDATED FOR PURPOSES OF ORAL ARGUMENT with 
Supreme Court Docket No 351 87, McKinney v. State. 
DATED this 3' day of December 2008. 
By Order of the Supreme Court 
%h h 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk V 
cc: Counsel of Record 
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